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Unconscionability and Consent in 
Corporate Law 
(A Comment on Cunningham) 
Kent Greenfield 
Lawrence Cunningham has written an insightful and persuasive article 
calling on courts to apply the contract-law doctrine of unconscionability in 
evaluating executive compensation.1 According to Cunningham, this 
additional doctrinal tool will allow courts to engage in genuine and 
meaningful oversight of excessive compensation. He argues that such 
oversight is valuable because existing corporate-law doctrine too often 
prompts courts to defer too much and too often to management’s decisions. 
Cunningham’s argument is modest yet impactful. It is modest in that it 
simply proposes that courts take account of a well-established area of 
contract law to analyze and evaluate the compensation contracts of 
corporate executives. It is impactful in that, as he points out, courts applying 
the doctrine of unconscionability will find that sometimes, some 
compensation contracts will be set aside. Perhaps courts will only find the 
worst of these contracts unconscionable. But that is more than zero, the 
number we can expect courts will find offensive to corporate-law norms as 
presently understood and adjudicated. 
This Essay will put Cunningham’s argument in the context of the larger 
debate over the dominant metaphors of corporate law. One way to tell the 
intellectual history of corporate law is to describe a battle between those who 
believe the dominant metaphor for the field is contract and those who 
believe it is property.2 In the contract metaphor, duties derive from 
voluntary agreements between and among parties to a deal. In the property 
metaphor, duties flow from status or rights, despite the absence of 
agreements or the existence of agreements to the contrary. One might think 
that Cunningham’s article fits squarely within the contract metaphor—he is, 
after all, calling on courts to use contract-law doctrine to evaluate corporate-
law questions. In my view, however, Cunningham’s argument fits within the 
 
   Professor of Law and Law Fund Research Scholar, Boston College Law School. 
 1. Lawrence A. Cunningham, A New Legal Theory To Test Executive Pay: Contractual 
Unconscionability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1177 (2011). 
 2. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 (1990). 
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larger movement away from the simplistic contractarian norms that have 
dominated the corporate-law field for the last generation. Cunningham’s 
argument in favor of contract doctrine is, in fact, best viewed as a 
celebration of property-law principles. Ironically, Cunningham’s article, 
arguing for an analysis based in contract law, is yet another attack on the 
dominance of contract reasoning in the theory and doctrine of corporate 
law. 
1. 
Early in the history of corporate law, both property and contract 
notions were prominent in theory and doctrine. In the famous 1819 Trustees 
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward case, Chief Justice Marshall said that 
corporations were state creations with such purposes “as the government 
wishes to promote.”3 According to the Court, the corporation was a “trustee” 
of those who contributed to it, a duty-based and status-based conception. 
This articulation sits best within a property metaphor, as the obligations of 
management, and indeed the corporation itself, came as a result of a 
bestowal of property rights, which carried with them obligations to the 
general public and to those who contributed to the entity. But Chief Justice 
Marshall also articulated a contract metaphor for the corporation, 
explaining that the understandings between the state and the college 
“constitute[d] a contract.”4 Indeed, the ultimate holding of the case—that 
the state of New Hampshire could not unilaterally amend the corporate 
charter—flows directly from contractual reasoning. 
In corporate law’s middle history, the property metaphor was 
ascendant. Berle and Means described the separation between ownership 
(shareholders) and control (management).5 Theorists and courts responded 
by developing the obligations managers should owe to the owners, whose 
property they controlled. In this period, the best source of the law of 
managerial obligation was derived from the law of trusts—the law of how 
one is entrusted with another’s property. Also during this period, courts 
took what appears to modern sensibilities as a hard look at managerial 
behavior because they viewed management as owing real duties to the firm. 
Courts even used the duty-encrusted rhetoric of property law to hold 
corporate executives to “something stricter than the morals of the market 
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.”6 
Over the last generation or so, the idea of corporation as contract has 
gained the upper hand. Now, the corporation is seen as a nexus of contracts 
 
 3. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 637 (1819). 
 4. Id. at 627. 
 5. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932). 
 6. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
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among a host of different contributors, and shareholders are not seen as 
owners but simply contributors of capital. Managerial obligations are derived 
from explicit, implicit, or default contractual terms between management 
and shareholders. Within the contractarian view of the field, law should not 
dictate the details of the obligations among a corporate contract’s parties 
because each party is assumed to know its own interests and to protect them 
through bargaining and exchange. In this way, the argument goes, 
developments in corporate charters and, indeed, in corporate law will trend 
toward efficiency because inefficient arrangements will cause participants in 
those arrangements to change the terms of the bargain over time in order to 
avoid losses. 
One of the main implications of the triumph of the contractarian 
theory is the massive deference courts now show to the decisions of 
corporate executives. The theory maintains that courts should not question 
corporate decisions because the market itself will correct any mistakes. The 
arrangements among the various parties are voluntary, so law does not need 
to step in to vary the terms of the deal. 
Perhaps the best statement of this assumption appears in Judge Winter’s 
famous opinion for the Second Circuit in Joy v. North, one of the earliest 
case-law articulations of the contractarian model.7 Explaining why 
shareholders should not be able to win a fiduciary-duty suit brought against 
negligent directors, Judge Winter posited that shareholders had chosen to 
take the risk of directors’ negligent behavior: “[S]hareholders to a very real 
degree voluntarily undertake the risk of bad business judgment.”8 How had 
they expressed their choice? By buying the stock. As Judge Winter stated: 
Investors need not buy stock, for investment markets offer an array 
of opportunities less vulnerable to mistakes in judgment by 
corporate officers. Nor need investors buy stock in particular 
corporations. In the exercise of what is genuinely a free choice, the 
quality of a firm’s management is often decisive and information is 
available from professional advisors. Since shareholders can and do 
select among investments partly on the basis of management, the 
business judgment rule merely recognizes a certain voluntariness in 
undertaking the risk of bad business decisions.9 
This view of contract is aggressive. The shareholders had not entered 
into an agreement waiving their right to sue the directors for a fiduciary-duty 
breach. But in Judge Winter’s view, investors entered into a contract because 
they acted in a way that brought about consequences they could have 
anticipated. In other words, because people know that some managers make 
 
 7. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 8. Id. at 887. 
 9. Id. at 885. 
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mistakes and because people are rational actors, we can assume people 
accept the risk of managerial mistakes when they purchase stock in a 
company. Thus, shareholders would receive a windfall if they were allowed 
to recover for those mistakes. 
The problems with this line of argument are many. The core problem is 
that this argument depends on a highly simplistic and problematic view of 
human rationality and voluntariness. In this line of thinking, we know what 
people want because their actions reflect what they want. This view of 
rationality is so thin that, in the words of Judge Posner, “[I]t would not be a 
solecism to speak of a rational frog.”10 In a way, the thinness of rationality is 
its power—we do not need to probe beyond the straightforward query of 
whether the corporation coerced an individual into behaving a certain way 
or fraudulently tricked the individual into behaving a certain way. If not, 
then courts should let things lie. 
Given this thin view of rationality and voluntariness, the fact that 
shareholders invested in the firm is evidence that they assumed the risk of 
whatever managerial malfeasance occurs. If they think malfeasance likely, 
then they should either not invest or ask for protections. If they do not 
protect themselves in such ways, they should not expect courts to rescue 
them after something goes wrong. 
As Cunningham explains, this is the state of things when it comes to 
challenges to excessive executive compensation. No matter how seemingly 
disproportionate the compensation is to the performance of the executive, 
courts will not intervene. Courts apply the deferential business-judgment 
rule, which means, in effect, that management wins. The implicit, 
contractual thinking is that shareholders should protect themselves; if they 
do not, then the fact that they have not is evidence that they have consented 
to the arrangement. 
2. 
While courts—particularly Delaware courts—have continued to 
implicitly adhere to contract theory by deferring almost completely to 
management in corporate-law cases,11 contractarianism has come under 
increasing attack by the academy. Behavioral economists’ insights have cast 
serious doubt on the rational-actor model underlying the theory, and a 
multitude of writers have pointed to several flaws in the simple versions of 
voluntariness and consent that form the basis of contractarian deference to 
agreements.12 
 
 10. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15 (3d ed. 1986). 
 11. See Kent Greenfield, Law, Politics, and the Erosion of Legitimacy in the Delaware Courts, 55 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 481, 495 (2010). 
 12. For the beginnings of a scholarship review, see Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral 
Economics To Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
581 (2002). 
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Cunningham recognizes these behavioral-economics insights. He says, 
for example, that “[t]he optimal-contracting model and agency–principal 
accounts work wonderfully in theory, but corporate governance realities 
make them often inaccurate descriptions of the actual state of affairs. 
Managerial power can be too great in some modern U.S. corporations to 
rely on the model’s envisioned contracting exercises.”13 In other words, 
contracts are not always trustworthy. 
They cannot be trusted, in part, because human choices are malleable 
and easily manipulated. Preferences can be created and destroyed. The 
more we understand about the way humans actually make decisions, the 
more we understand that humans do not easily fit within the neoclassical 
view of rational actors. Any sophisticated account of “voluntariness,” 
“consent,” or “choice” has to come to terms with bounded rationality and 
bounded will power, and contain a richer definition of self-interest.14 
Here is the real issue. As a matter of theory, contractarianism makes 
sense only when we assume humans are different from, and simpler than, we 
really are. We can go ahead and assume voluntariness when it does not exist; 
we can assume people agree when they do not; we can assume people 
maximize their own welfare when they do not. But if we create legal 
doctrines based on these assumptions, we need to acknowledge that we are 
basing our governing rules not on reality but on constructs. And we use 
these constructs not because they do a good job of predicting behavior but 
because they make it easier for the law to derive an answer in a legal dispute, 
even if they do not actually represent human behavior at any level of 
nuance. 
I find it interesting that the law lags behind other areas of academic 
research in understanding human behavior. Social science is increasingly 
sophisticated in its understanding of human cognition, behavior, and 
choice. One can hardly open up a mainstream news periodical without 
reading about a social-science experiment about how humans act 
predictably but “irrationally” from an economic perspective. Popular books 
such as Predictably Irrational,15 Nudge,16 Stumbling on Happiness,17 and Blink18 
translate these findings for the general reading public.19 Some cutting-edge 
legal scholars are beginning to explore the implications for law, but their 
insights are not yet widely adopted by courts. 
 
 13. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 1190–91. 
 14. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1471, 1476–93 (1998). 
 15. DANIEL ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL (2008). 
 16. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008). 
 17. DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2007). 
 18. MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK (2005). 
 19. With hope, I might add KENT GREENFIELD, THE MYTH OF CHOICE: PERSONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY IN A WORLD OF LIMITS (forthcoming 2011). 
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Having said that, there is one area of law that seems receptive to the 
behavioralists’ insights. Ironically, that area is contracts. For centuries, 
contract law has struggled with the question of when otherwise valid 
contracts should be set aside because of unfairness in the bargain, mistake, 
duress, bad faith, undue influence, or unconscionability. In a sense, each of 
these doctrines allows courts to oversee the substance of deals and set aside 
those contracts that do not seem to fit with a genuine sense of voluntariness 
or choice. As Cunningham says, unconscionability “signals absence of 
mutual assent” and allows courts to set aside particularly “obnoxious 
arrangements.”20 The same can be said about the other doctrines listed 
above. All in all, the main purpose of these doctrines is to allow courts to 
mitigate the harshness of contract law in the most egregious cases of 
unfairness. 
Over the centuries, the availability of these doctrines has waxed and 
waned, mostly as a function of whether the legal zeitgeist was one of respect 
for parties’ autonomy (in a libertarian sense) or one more understanding of 
the vagaries of human behavior and consent. But even in eras in which the 
“freedom” of contract was most revered, contract law included these 
mitigating doctrines as possible tools of analysis for courts. In a sense, then, 
contract law has long understood that a robotic application of simplistic 
notions of voluntariness can result in outcomes that do not map well to 
strong public policy or a sophisticated understanding of genuine human 
agency. 
Another way to describe these contract-limiting doctrines is to say that 
they import property-based limitations into contract law. The availability of 
these doctrines allows courts to say: “We understand that the agreement 
might be considered valid if we considered only superficial notions of 
voluntariness, but we also understand that human decision making has 
limits and flaws. This agreement offends one of the parties’ right to be 
treated with a basic level of dignity and fairness. We therefore set it aside 
and refuse to enforce it.” 
Perhaps oddly, whether we want courts to say this depends less on the 
substance of the statement than on what we think of courts. The attraction 
of courts using the neoclassical-economics view of human rationality is that it 
is clear. It allows courts to make judgments based on straightforward 
assumptions about human behavior. Although it is clear, the shortcoming of 
the neoclassical school of human rationality is that as we are learning more 
and more, humans do not act in economically rational ways much of the 
time. Humans are messy; we act out of love, altruism, spite, stupidity, loyalty, 
and other irrational motivations. 
Contrastingly, the shortcoming of a more robust view of human agency 
is that it is not clear. Courts and other decision makers will be unsure how to 
 
 20. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 1214–15. 
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draw the line between choices that should be respected and those that 
should not. The advantage of a more robust view of human agency is that it 
is more accurate. We lose clarity but gain a more nuanced sense of the way 
humans actually behave. 
If we think courts should, above all, create clear rules that people can 
plan around, then we should adopt the neoclassical account of human 
agency and the benefit of its clear rules. If, on the other hand, we think 
courts should seek to make judgments based on the contexts and equities of 
each case, then we should provide them with doctrines to allow flexibility. 
The costs of such flexibility are real, but they may be outweighed by the 
benefits of empowering courts to seek equity in complicated, messy, human 
situations. 
3. 
Now back to corporate law. 
I applaud Cunningham’s proposal to import contractual 
unconscionability into corporate law. I applaud it because it moves us away 
from contractarianism and toward a more robust and sophisticated 
understanding of how the world—even the business world—actually works. 
I also applaud it because it helps make clear that the dominant “nexus 
of contracts” theory of corporate law is based less on contract doctrine than 
on relatively simplistic contract theory. The theory takes as its guide a laissez-
faire, Lochner-era view of contractual freedom that has little purchase outside 
of corporate law. In contract law itself, as Cunningham makes clear, the 
neoclassical-economic view of human rationality is mitigated by a number of 
available doctrines, such as unconscionability. Cunningham’s argument that 
courts should use unconscionability to evaluate executive pay is therefore 
perfectly designed to highlight this insight. It turns out that it is not contract 
law the contractarian corporate-law scholars want to mimic, but 
libertarianism. 
Why is that so bad? If we think that law should do something other than 
empower the most powerful people among us to become even more 
powerful, then it is bad. Libertarianism, at its base, simply asks that 
government stay out of all private exchanges, other than when government 
is needed to enforce them. But if we believe that certain rights should be 
“taken for granted” and not subjected to bargaining, then we need to 
balance our respect for voluntary exchanges with legal doctrines and 
principles that open our eyes to issues of genuine human agency, human 
dignity, and fairness.21 
This may seem far afield from traditional corporate-law analysis, and 
perhaps it is. But it need not be. It might be possible for courts—yes, even 
 
 21. Joseph W. Singer, Things that We Would Like To Take for Granted: Minimum Standards for 
the Legal Framework of a Free and Democratic Society, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 139 (2008). 
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courts in Delaware—to do something other than merely validate whatever 
management has decided. It might be possible for courts to take a genuine 
hard look at executive pay, even when compensation derives from a putative 
agreement between corporate executives and the corporations they run. It 
might be possible to ask courts to take responsibility for truly judging the 
equities of a certain deal, rather than hiding behind beliefs of contractarian 
infallibility that contract law itself does not accept. It might be possible to 
have corporate-law doctrine contain within it some kind of fiduciary duty in 
fact rather than just in name. And that would be progress. 
